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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ute, and, if the cause of action not resulting in death should survive,
that the cause of action resulting in death should also survive.' 6
This is apparently the view of the court in the principal federal
case' 7 and it is submitted as correct.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Measure of Compensation
for Loss of Member
In the workmen's compensation laws of various jurisdictions are
found provisions for temporary total disability caused by industrial
accidents and for specific injuries,-such as loss of fingers. For total
disability of temporary or permanent character it is uniformly stipu-
lated that the compensation shall run during such liability, or for
the statutory period.' The three types of statute dealing with spe-
cific injuries are: (1) Those which provide that compensation for
specific injuries shall "be in lieu of all other compensation," 2 or its
practical equivalent, that the compensation period shall begin to
run from the date of the injury ;3 (2) Those which provide that com-
pensation under one section of the law shall be in addition to other
compensation;4 (3) Those which simply set up a scale of compen-
sation, or indemnity, and leave the court to work out a proper inter-
pretation of the whole statute as best it can.5
Court decisions interpreting these provisions of the statutes like-
wise fall into fairly well defined groups. One group of courts holds
that during the healing period while the workman is unable to work,
he may recover for total disability, and then, when he has returned
to work, he is to receive the full statutory amount for the specific
"Prior to the amendment of REv. (1905) §157 (2) by N. C. PUB. LAws
(1915) c. 38, striking out the clause, "where such injury does not cause the
death of the injured party," the cause of action for personal injuries abated,
and only the cause of action for the wrongful death remained. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., stepra note 7; MCINToSH, N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929) §424.
"James Baird Co., Inc. v. Boyd, supra note 4.
IN. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill's 1923) c. 66, §15; IowA CODE (1927) §1394;
N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §29.
' GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3154 (32); Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922)
§4899.
'IOWA CODE (1927) §1396.
'MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 152, §36; CLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's
Mills, 1927) §1853.
'N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §31; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (MM).
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injuries sustained.6 A second group holds that he may recover total
disability compensation only until the extent of the specific injury is
determined, and thereafter for the full amount provided for such
injury.7 A third rule is that under no circumstances may an employee
who has suffered a specific injury provided for by the statute recover
more than the bare amount thus stipulated.8 Still other courts hold
that while in the case of such specific injury the statutory period of
compensation may not be lengthened, the employee is entitled to total
disability compensation until such time as the extent of the specific
injury can be determined, the number of weeks such compensation
was received to be deducted from the statutory period during which
compensation for the specific injury was to run.9 Thus a man who
is disabled for nine weeks before it is determined that amputation
of a finger is necessary will, under a statute which provides that
compensation for the loss of a finger shall be a certain percentage of
his wages for thirty-five weeks, receive compensation for total dis-
ability during nine weeks and for the loss of his finger during the
remaining twenty-six weeks of the statutory period. The New York
Court of Appeals and at least one Federal Court hold that even when
there are several injuries arising out of the same accident the em-
ployee may recover only for that injury for which compensation runs
over the longest period of time.10
It is impossible to tell by reading the statute of a given state what
interpretation will be given to it by the court. Under identical stat-
utes the holdings of various courts differ radically." Under statutes
that are not, on the face of them, at all alike the rule laid down by
different courts is sometimes exactly the same. 12 In one instance a
' Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lilly, 140 Atl. 215 (Md. 1925); Gobble v.
Clinch Valley Lumber Co., 141 Va. 303; Western Steel Erecting Co. v. Luck-
enbill, 287 Pac. 724 (Okla. 1930).
'Addison v. Wood, 207 Mich. 319, 174 N. W. 149 (1919); Poast v. Omaha
Merchants' Express and Transfer Co., 107 Neb. 516, 186 N. W. 540 (1922);
Phillip's Case, 123 Me. 501, 124 Atl. 211 (1924).
' Fame Armstrong Laundry Co. v. Brooks, 226 Ky. 25, 10 S. W. (2nd) 479
(1928); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 119 S. E. 721 (1923);
Moses v. National Union Coal Co., 194 Iowa 819, 184 S. W. 746 (1921).
'Jack v. Knoxville Fertilizer Co., 154 Tenn. 292, 289 S. W. 500 (1926).
" Texas Employer's Insurance Association v. Sheppeard, 32 F. (2d) 300
(S. D. Tex. 1929); Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 372
(1917).
'Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, supra note 8; Gobble v. Clinch Valley
Lumber Co., supra note 6; GA. ANN. CoDa (Michie, 1926); §3154 (32); VA.
CODE ANN. (1924) §1887 (32).
"Hardin v. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 147 La. 453, 85 So. 202 (1920) ; Wirth
Lang Co. v. Mece, 211 Ky. 520, 277 S. W. 834 (1925); Ky. STAT. (Carroll,
1922) §4899; LA. PuB. LAWS (1922) act 43, §(d).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
court modified its former ruling, stating that it did so in order to
conform to the rule of another state which had an identical statute.
As a matter of fact the rule in that other state was, at that time
diametrically opposite to the rule then being promulgated. 13
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in attempting to construe
an ambiguous statute which merely sets up one scale of compensation
for total disability in one section and another scale for specific in-
juries in another section of the law lays down the rule that the pro-
visions of these sections are not mutually exclusive, and holds that
recovery may be had consecutively under each of them.
In a recent case it has held that when an employee sustained a
badly lacerated hand, necessitating immediate amputation of fingers,
he was entitled to compensation for total disability during the healing
period, and to full compensation for the loss of his fingers after the
wounds had healed.' 4 It is submitted that this is a sound result.
Under any other interpretation of the law it is quite possible that in
case of a long healing period after the extent of the specific injuries
has been determined, the statutory period will have run before the
injured man is able to return to work. In such case the employee
would not only lose a good share of his earnings over a long period
of time but would return to industry without a cent of indemnity
for the injury that was permanent in character-a result that could
hardly have been within the contemplation of the legislature in pass-
ing the act. There is no indication within the statute itself that it
was intended that the two sections construed in the principal case
should be mutually exclusive. The decision serves well what seems
to be the underlying purpose of all Workmen's Compensation Laws.
ALLEN LANGSTON.
Workmen's Compensation-Recovery for Injuries
Resulting from Horseplay
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act' provides that
compensable injuries are only those injuries "by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment." An employee was injured
by the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of a fellow-em-
ployee. The injured man took no part in the "horseplay," but was
' Gobble v. Clinch Valley Lumber Co., supra note 6.
"Rice v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 199 N. C. 154, 154 S. E. 69 (1930).
'N. C. PuB. LAws (1929)'c. 120, §2 (f); N. C. ANx. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (i).
